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Since the mass protests in Iran in 2009 and the upheavals in the Middle East and 
North Africa in 2011 and 2012, many scholars have sought to understand the role of 
new media technologies in fueling grassroots social movements across the region.1 
Previous attempts had been made to study the relationship between new information 
communication technologies (ITCs) and political change.2 However, in 2009, prominent 
Western media outlets hailed social media as a panacea for democratic reform, labeling 
the post-election uprisings in Iran as the “Twitter Revolution”3—a notion that has been 
challenged as vastly over-simplified.4  
There is no doubt that social networking sites (SNSs) and new media 
platforms have globalized communications: today, nearly one billion 
users around the world use Facebook on a common platform. While this 
has encouraged a plethora of research on new media technologies and 
their impacts on state-society relations, there are still key gaps in our 
knowledge and understanding about how these technologies are being 
mobilized in, and shaped by, different cultural and political contexts. 
Although social networking sites and online media in general are indeed 
creating new modes of communication that can potentially foster social 
and political change, it is unclear how and in what capacities these 
platforms are being moblized to enhance civic participation in the public 
sphere. As such, key questions remain over what role social media and 
social networking technologies played, and are playing, in the democra-
tization and political reform efforts in Iran or across the Middle East. 
It is therefore necessary to examine more closely the national and regional dimensions 
of new media use in order to better understand how users in different geographical 
and political contexts are interacting with these platforms and their various features in 
practice—particularly in societies in which media and communications are heavily state 
INTRODUCTION
1    Sean Aday et al., Blogs and Bullets: 
New Media in Contentious Politics (Wash-
ington  D.C.: Institute of Peace, 2010); 
Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Information 
Technology and Political Islam, Oxford 
Studies in Digital Politics (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson, 
“Social Media and the Decision to Partic-
ipate in Political Protest: Observations 
From Tahrir Square,” Journal of Commu-
nication 62, no. 2 (2012): 363–379.
2    R. Kelly Garrett, “Protest in an Infor-
mation Society: A Review of Literature 
on Social Movements and New ICTs,” In-
formation, Communication & Society 9, no. 
2 (April 2006): 202–224; Patrick Meier, 
“Do ‘Liberation Technologies’ Change the 
Balance of Power between Repressive 
States and Civil Society?” (PhD, Tuft 
University, 2011); Wim van de Donk et al., 
eds., Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens, 
and Social Movements (London ; New 
York: Routledge, 2004).
3  See for example, “Editorial: Iran’s 
Twitter revolution,” Washington Times, 
June 16, 2009; Andrew Sullivan, “The 
Revolution Will Be Twittered,” The 
Atlantic, The Daily Dish, June 13, 2009; 
Nathan Hodge, “Taking to the Streets — 
and Tweets — in Tehran,” Wired, June 13, 
2009; “Tweeting Iran: Elex news in 140 
characters or less,” Associated Press, 15 
June 2009.  
4   Early critics of the “Twitter Revolu-
tion” include: Jack Shafer, “Doubting 
Twitter: Let’s not get carried away about 
its role in the Iranian demonstrations,” 
Slate, June 17, 2009; Maximilian Forte, 
“America’s Iranian Twitter Revolu-
tion,” Zero Anthropology, June 17, 2009; 
Anne-Marie Corley, “The Web vs. The 
Republic of Iran: Twitter gives Iranians a 
voice, but the government still controls 
the Internet,” MIT Technology Review, 
June 18 2009; Evgeny Morozov, “Iran: 
Downside to the ‘Twitter Revolution’,” 
Dissent, Fall 2009; Malcolm Gladwell, 
“Small Change: Why the Revolution 
Will Not Be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, 
October 4, 2010.  
In 2009, prominent 
Western media  
hailed social media 
as a panacea for  
democratic reform, 
labeling the post- 
election uprisings in 
Iran as the  “Twitter 
Revolution”—a 
notion that has been 
challenged as vastly 
over-simplified.
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controlled. This is especially relevant in the Iranian case, as social networking sites are fa-
cilitating communications between Iranians, and between Iranians and the global commu-
nity, despite extensive efforts by domestic authorities to impede access to these platforms 
through filtering and throttling internet speeds.5
Although Facebook has been blocked in Iran since 20096—accessible only 
with illegal circumvention tools—this has done little to thwart its popu-
larity. While there is no available data on the number of Iranian Facebook 
users, social media and social networking sites in general have been 
avidly embraced by a broad spectrum of Iranian society—from the young 
cyber-savvy majority to Iran’s political and religious elites. On a policy 
level, there are conflicting perspectives regarding the state’s position on 
social media use, as reflected in contradictory comments from officials. 
The recent uptick of high-profile political officials and ministers maintain-
ing active Facebook and Twitter accounts highlights the inherent contra-
dictions and paradoxes of the regime’s stance on social media.7   
It also demonstrates the complexity and dynamics of online 
communications policies and culture in Iran more broadly. The dramatic 
rise of internet and social media usage in Iran since the early 2000s 
has reconfigured communication and information flows not only among 
Iranian citizens but also between citizens and elites. While utilizing social 
media and social networking sites to carry messages to mass audiences, 
authorities have at the same time have sought to curb access to these 
platforms in an effort to quell possible anti-government citizen activism. 
This was especially evident in the post-2009 context, when authorities 
cracked down on social networking sites and bloggers, and intesified its filtering and 
blocking of websites deemed to promote social and political unrest. 
Yet beyond the dominant focus on social media use in the political context, it is equally 
important to look at social media within the broader Iranian media ecology, as well as to 
get a closer read on how Iranians use and re-purpose these platforms under particular 
social conditions.  
5   Along with introducing a cap on high-
speed broadband for residential internet 
connections in 2006, authorities often 
slow connection speeds as a form of  
censorship. See Collin Anderson, “Dim-
ming the Internet: Detecting Throttling 
as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran,” 
arXiv, June 18, 2013. 
6   Facebook was initially filtered in Iran 
in 2008 and then briefly removed in 
early 2009. During the 2009 presiden-
tial election campaigns, Facebook 
was filtered for three days (May 23-26, 
2009) and has been filtered since June 
12, 2009. See “Iran’s Facebook Access 
Restored,” BBC Persian, May 26, 2009.
7   In many cases some of Iranian 
officials have commented that Facebook 
is not illegal and filtering might be 
removed but  in response other officials 
have rejected these statements. See: 
“Negotiation about removing Facebook 
filtering in Iran, criticized by members 
of Parliament,” BBC Persian, November 
23, 2013. “Facebook is an espionage 
site, played a role in the 2009 unrests,” 
BBC Persian, December 9, 2013.
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INTRODUCTION
Morteza Erfanian et al., “Iranian 
Students and Social Networking 
Sites: Prevalence and Pattern of 
Usage.” 2nd World Conference on 
Educational Technology Research, 83 
(2013), 44–46. 
 
Hojjat A. Farahani et al., “Examin-
ing mental health indices in students 
using Facebook in Iran,” World Con-
ference on Educational Technology 
Research. 28 (2011), 811–814. 
Younes Nouri Moradabadi et al, 
“What is the Motivation Student of 
Iranians for using Facebook?” 4th 
World Conference on Educational 
Sciences, February 2012, Barcelona, 
Spain, 46(2012), 5192–5195. 
Elahe Shabani et al., Motivations, 
Concerns, and Strategies of Facebook 
Users in Iran, (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 2013).
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar 
Smith. “Will Politics  Be Tweeted? 
New Media Use by Iranian Youth in 
2011,” New Media & Society, March 
2013. 
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar 
Smith.  “Finding A Way:  How Ira-
nians Reach for News and Informa-
tion,” Iran Media Program, Center 
for Global Communication Studies, 
Annenberg School for Communi-
cation, University of Pennsylvania, 
2011-2012.
This report, based on an online survey of Iranian Facebook users, contributes to a small 
but growing body of scholarship on social and new media use in Iran. Our findings offer new 
insights into the Iranian Facebook ecosystem, including patterns of Facebook usage among 
Iranians, why and how Iranians are using Facebook, what types of content they are sharing, 
as well as perceptions of privacy and security associated with using Facebook. In addition, the 
survey addresses the key question of whether Facebook is being used as a tool for political 
engagement and civic activism among Iranian internet users, as initial assessments suggest-
ed.
Additional Research on Social  Media Usage in Iran
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Our findings are based on 188 responses to an online survey of Iranian Facebook users  
conducted in October and November 2012. 
The survey addressed the following areas of inquiry:
  ACCESSING FACEBOOK: How Iranians access Facebook, including internet   
              connection speeds,  hardware, and use of circumvention tools.
  FACEBOOK ACTIVITIES: Why Iranians use Facebook and what are their                  
                primary Facebook activities.
 SECURITY AND PRIVACY: Concerns about private information and potential                
 risks associated with Facebook use.
  ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITIES: Additional social networking and social                                                              
             media usage, including blogging.                          
Adding nuance to widespread notions about the SNS usage in Iran as a 
means for political engagement, our findings show that while Iranians do 
indeed use Facebook for social and political activism,8 its main use is as a 
vehicle for socializing. This reinforces more recent studies demonstrating 
that Iranians use Facebook as a virtual space to socialize, especially with 
the opposite sex.9 However respondents also cite accessing news and infor-
mation unavaible through official channels as one of their main reasons for 
using Facebook. 
Our research reveals a difference in patterns of content-following and 
content-sharing behaviors among Iranian Facebook users: respondents 
more often follow rather than share content, particularly politically-related 
materials, which may demonstrate the perceived security risks associated 
with using Facebook. In light of our data showing that fewer individuals 
use Facebook as a means of political engagement, this may also indicate 
that that more respondents are passive rather than active Facebook users. 
Notably, respondents are least interested in sharing or following religious 
content. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
8  Only 5% of respondents report that 
their main reason for using Facebook 
is as a platform for social and political 
activist; See Chapter 2, “Facebook Activ-
ities,” page 14. 
9  Emad Khazraee and Kristene Un-
sworth, “Social Media: The New Opiate 
of the Masses?,” International Review 
of Information Ethics 18 (2012): 49–59; 
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Briar Smith, 
“Will Politics Be Tweeted? New Media 
Use by Iranian Youth in 2011,” New Media 
& Society (March 25, 2013).
Few respondents
rely on Facebook  
primarily for 
political activism: 
most use Facebook 
to  socialize.
Respondents more   
often follow than 
share content,          
particularly materials 
related to politics.  
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According to our data, a majority of respondents have managed to bypass 
the state’s 2006 ban on high speed broadband for residential internet ser-
vices.10 A large majority of respondents access Facebook with high-speed 
broadband from home, which could indicate a loosened approach among 
ISPs toward enforcing this regulation. 
Our findings also show that survey respondents use a variety of circumven-
tion tools to access Facebook. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are over-
whelmingly the most popular solution. Younger demographics are familiar 
with a more diverse set of tools in comparison to older generation, espe-
cially those requiring more technical skills. Despite being illegal, there is 
no clear consensus on the security of using these tools: the sample was 
almost evenly divided between whether these tools are secure, not secure, 
or “neither.” 
Respondents have major concerns about security and privacy in the Face-
book environment and are not very trusting of others in general, according 
to our data. A majority of survey participants report that they believe that 
using Facebook could pose risks to their security, and to their job pros-
pects and reputation. Nevertheless, despite security concerns and ob-
stacles accessing Facebook (e.g. filtering and slow internet connections), 
results reveal that respondents spend a considerable amount of time on 
Facebook on a daily and weekly basis.
In addition, our data reveal both generational and gender differences in 
Facebook usage among respondents. It is not surprising that younger 
survey participants (ages 20-25) are more fluent in digital technology use 
than older respondents. Younger users, however, prefer to use Facebook 
for sharing personal ideas and opinions, and are less interested in sharing 
and following political content than older age groups surveyed. Younger 
respondents are also are less concerned about possible security risks 
and professional consequences associated with using Facebook than older 
respondents. 
According to our research, females more often share content related to 
cultural issues, domestic news and events, societal/civic issues, gender, and 
the environment than male respondents. Males tend to share more content 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
10   In 2006, authorities introduced a cap 
on broadband speeds faster than 128 
kbps for residential internet services. 
Faster internet connections are available 
for commercial users, and at universi-
ties and internet cafes. However, in the 
past home users often bypassed these 
restrictions by obtaining certifications 
for high-speed internet from friends 
or business associates. More recently, 
there is evidence that ISPs may no longer 
be enforcing the 2006 decree.  
Most access Facebook 
with high-speed 
internet  from home, 
despite the 2006 ban 
on  residential DSL 
broadband.
Respondents use a 
number of circum-
vention tools to access 
Facebook, with a large 
majority preferring 
Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs). 
Despite security
concerns, most 
respondents spend a 
considerable amount 
of time on Facebook.
Female respondents 
are less concerned 
than males about 
posting photos on 
Facebook in which 
they are engaged in 
illegal, taboo, or 
impolite activities. 
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related to the economy, science/IT, and sports. However, female and male 
respondents share content on domestic politics, foreign affairs, international 
politics, and religion with similar frequency. Survey results also demonstrate 
that female respondents are less concerned than male respondents about 
posting photos on Facebook in which they are engaged in activities that could 
be considered illegal or impolite (such as drinking alcohol or dancing)
In addition, our survey results suggest that social networking sites and 
social media are very popular among respondents: a majority are active on 
at least two other social networking sites besides Facebook, and about two 
thirds report that they maintained a blog at some point. Younger respond-
ents more actively use social media, according to our data.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Most respondents are 
active on at least two 
other social network-
ing sites, and about 
two thirds report that 
they maintained a blog 
at some point.
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Our sample consists of 188 Iranian Facebook users,11 a large majority of which (85%) have 
been using Facebook for more than two years. This indicates that most survey respondents 
were likely using Facebook during the 2009 election.12  
 A majority of the sample is comprised of respondents younger than age 30. Most hold 
at least a bachelor’s degree. Roughly a third is female and two thirds male.
SURVEY SAMPLE
Figure 1:  Age Group of Respondents
5%  PhD or equivalent
1%  Less than high school
9%  Graduated high school
13%  Some college
38%  Undergraduate degree
35%  Master’s degree
25-29 30-39  18-24 40-49 50-64
34% 38%21% 6% 3%
41.5%
Female
Male
 11 There were 129 fully completed 
questionnaires and 59 partially 
completed questionnaires (completion 
rate 69%). 
 12  The online surveys were 
completed between October and 
November 2012. A link to the Persian-
language survey was distributed using 
Facebook’s advertising system, as 
well as by using additional snowball 
sampling methods to spread the link 
on Facebook (for more information on 
survey methods, see Annex).
Figure 2:  Respondents’ Education Level
Figure 3:  Respondents’ Gender
58.5%
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Iran’s notoriously slow internet speeds are a major impediment to accessing Facebook and 
other sites with multi-media or media-rich content. Along with a 2006 ban on high-speed 
broadband for residential internet services,13 authorities often throttle web traffic as a 
means of censoring and blocking access to internet content, as was the case during the 
2009 and 2013 presidential elections in Iran.14 Hence, our survey asked respondents what 
types of internet connection speeds and hardware they typically use to access Facebook,   
as a means of understanding how survey participants contend with basic technological    
barriers to accessing the social networking site.
1. ACCESSING FACEBOOK
1.1 Internet connections, hardware, and access locations
A majority of respondents report connecting to 
Facebook with high-speed broadband from 
home, which indicates that these users 
have secured fast connections despite the 
state’s 2006 ban on broadband DSL for 
residential internet services. In addition, most 
respondents report using personal laptops or 
mobile phones to access Facebook.
KEY
FINDINGS:
13   Collin Anderson, “Dimming the Inter-
net: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism 
of Censorship in Iran,” arXiv, June 18, 
2013.
14   Anderson, “Dimming the Internet.”
Our data show that the most common internet connection used by participants is high speed 
broadband over 128 kbps, followed by WiMAX connections, and slower broadband up to 128 
kbps, respectively. No one surveyed uses a dial-up connection. It appears that WiMax is 
very well-received among respondents, which shows the potential growth of satellite-based  
wireless technologies in Iran.
 Connection types and speeds
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WiMax
Broadband (DSL/Cable 
- speed level up to 128 
kbps)
Broadband  
(DSL/Cable – faster  
than 128 kbps)
63% 20% 17%
Respondents most often use personal computers to access Facebook. Mobile data plans 
are not very common or affordable in Iran and their connection speeds are not very 
fast; therefore, many Facebook users inside Iran tend to use mobile phones with Wi-Fi         
connections.
 Hardware 
Figure 4:  Internet Connections 
Figure 5:  Device Used to Access Facebook
Dial up
0%
97%
Tablet
Personal 
computer
ACCESSING FACEBOOK
Mobile phone
97%
33%
 16%
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Most respondents access Facebook from home, which is not surprising given that           
Facebook is blocked and accessible only with illegal circumvention tools. Although few-
er report accessing Facebook in public spaces, the percentage of respondents who use 
Facebook at work is high, with roughly 40% saying they access Facebook from their work-
place. This is likely due to the fact that businesses often have high-speed DSL connections. 
The least number of respondents report accessing Facebook at internet cafes, which may         
reflect the increased scrunity and regulations under which internet cafes operate.15
15  “The Regulations and Conditions 
of Computer Information Networks,” 
Approved by the SCRC 12/9/2001, http://
goo.gl/sZAwT; For specifications related 
to internet cafes, see Internet Service 
Regulations at: http://www.cyberpolice.
ir/page/3031, and Cyber Police Directive 
for Internet Cafes at: http://www.cyber-
police.ir/page/11631. 
 Access locations 
Figure 6: Locations Used to Access Facebook
ACCESSING FACEBOOK
home
work
via mobile 
phone another
person’s
home
internet
café
public
library
other
school
92%
42%
30%
21%
9%
4%
2%
18%
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In addition to slow internet speeds, internet filtering is a key obstacle to accessing Facebook 
inside Iran. With Facebook blocked since 2009, domestic users can access the site only by 
relying on illegal circumvention. Despite criminal penalties for using these tools, Iranians 
frequently rely on circumvention technologies to bypass the state’s internet filter and access 
banned web content, including Facebook.16
16  The 2009 Computer Crime Law specifies 
criminal penalties for accessing filtered or 
blocked content through the use of illegal 
circumvention tools. See: Computer Crimes 
Law, in Farsi, at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/
show/135717. See also, Ameneh Dehshiri, 
“Legality of Bypassing Internet Filtering in 
Iran,” CGCS Media Wire, Center for Glob-
al Communication Studies, Annenberg 
School for Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania, http://cgcsblog.asc.upenn.
edu/2013/06/10/legality-of-bypassing-inter-
net-filtering-in-iran/.
1.2  Circumvention Tools
ACESSING FACEBOOK
Respondents report using three to four types of circumvention 
tools to access Facebook. The overwhelming preference is for 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), although respondents also 
report relying frequently on other platforms, such as FreeGate, 
Ultrasurf, Tor and Socks. There is no strong consensus among 
respondents regarding the security risks of using circumvention 
tools. Although these tools are illegal, most respondents check 
their Facebook acounts several times a day and spend more than 
10 hours a week on Facebook. 
KEY
FINDINGS:
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are by far the most popular circumvention tool used 
to access Facebook, used by nearly 8 out of 10 respondents. 
More than half of participants report having also used Freegate and Ultrasurf to 
access Facebook, respectively.
According to our data:
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ACESSING FACEBOOK
Figure 8: Frequency of Circumvention Tool Usage (by age group)   
<25 25-29 30-39 >40
VPN
Freegate
Ultrasurf
Socks
Tor
VPNs are most popular among respond-
ents over age 40. This may be due to the fact 
that VPNs are easier to use, while tools like 
Freegate and Ultrasurf require more technical 
expertise. 
Socks is more often used by respondents 
younger than age 25 as compared to other 
age groups surveyed. Again, this may be 
due to the higher digital literacy level among 
younger respondents.
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59% 59%
59%61%44%
41%
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55%
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Despite that these tools are 
illegal, a majority of respond-
ents check their accounts 
several times a day.
ACCESSING FACEBOOK
Figure 10:  Frequency of Checking Facebook
Figure 9:   Security of Circumvention Tools
Figure 11:   Time Spent (per week) on Facebook
59%
27%
About once a day
Several times a day
There is no strong con-
sensus among respondents 
regarding the risks of using 
circumvention tools. The 
sample was nearly evenly 
split between those who be-
lieve these tools are secure, 
not secure, and those who 
said “neither.”
We also asked respondents about their perceptions of security risks associated with using 
circumvention tools. 
Very insecure/ 
insecure 
Neither
32%
38%
31%
Most respondents spend 
more than 10 hours a week 
on Facebook.
1-3 hours
Up to  
60 minutes
17%
18%
15%
3-5 hours
More than  
10 hours
32%
19%
5-10 hours
Very secure/
secure
According to our data:
6%
2%
2%
4%
1-2 days a week
3-5 days a week
Every few weeks
Less often
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Given the regulatory and technological restrictions to accessing Facebook in Iran, our 
survey sought to better understand the broader Facebook environment among Iranian 
users, and address questions regarding what motivates Iranians to use the social media 
site, what their primary Facebook activities are, as well as patterns of liking, following, 
commenting on, and sharing content.    
2. FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES 
In an effort to assess how Facebook is being utilized—including what role, if any, Facebook 
plays as a platform for political activism in Iran—our survey asked respondents about their 
main reasons for using Facebook.
2.1 Primary Reasons for Using Facebook
Respondents mainly use Facebook to communicate 
with friends and family, to access alternative news 
and information, and for entertainment purposes, 
respectively. A smaller percentage of those surveyed 
report using  Facebook as a platform for social and 
political   activism. This indicates that while users do 
indeed rely on Facebook to access information and 
for political communication, a larger majority use the 
social networking site to socialize.
KEY
FINDINGS:
Staying in touch with friends and family is the top reason for using Facebook, cited by six 
out of ten survey respondents.       
Accessing news and information not available through official media outlets is the         
second-most popular reason for using Facebook, cited by roughly 15% of our sample.
Entertainment ranks third among the top reasons for using Facebook, according to more 
than 10% of respondents surveyed.      
Only 5% report relying on Facebook to promote social and political activism as their main 
reason for using the social media site. 
According to our data:
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FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
Figure 12: Primary Reason for Using Facebook
60%
Learning about news and 
information unavailable 
through official channels
For entertainment 
(killing time)
As a way to contribute 
to social and political 
activism
Other 
Professional 
networking 
Because  
everyone has  
a Facebook account
Gaming
Finding friends 
As a way to meet 
potential romantic 
partners
Staying in touch 
with friends and  
family
16%
11%
5%
3%
3%
1%
1%
0%
1%
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Our survey also asked respondents more detailed questions about their Facebook activities in 
order to gauge levels of participation and interactivity among users, as well as to investigate 
patterns of liking, commenting on, following and sharing content.
FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
2.2  Liking, commenting, following and sharing 
Most respondents appear to be “passive” Facebook users: 
they tend to follow more often than share content, and 
“like” more often than comment on others’ posts. In 
addition, a majority share more personal content than 
materials related to domestic and international politics 
and news. Respondents are least interested in sharing 
and following religious content compared to other types 
of  materials.
KEY
FINDINGS:
“Liking” and commenting on their friends’ posts are among respondents’ most popular 
Facebook activities.
Respondents less frequently update their own status or share links, photos, or videos, respectively.
Only a small percentage of respondents engage in more participatory activities, such as 
moderating groups or creating events on Facebook.
According to our data:
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Figure 13: Respondents’ Primary Facebook Activities
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FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
Our research also reveals interesting patterns in content-following and content-sharing 
behaviors among respondents.  
According to our survey:
Respondents more frequently share content related to personal thoughts and opinions 
compared to any other types of materials. 
Respondents more often follow than share content in general. This is particularly true 
for materials related to domestic news and politics, the economy, foreign affairs and                
international politics.
There is little difference in the frequency of following and sharing habits on cultural,  
community, professional issues and religion, respectively.17
Religion is the least-frequently followed and shared topic among survey respondents.18
Figure 14: Frequency of Following and Sharing Content
17   Within a 3 percentage-point range.
18  This demonstrates a difference 
between the interests of Iranian social 
network users and those in Middle 
Eastern countries. According to a recent 
study published by Pew Global Attitude 
Project more than 60% of SNS users in 
Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia share content 
about religion. See: Andrew Kohut et 
al., Social Networking Popular Across 
Globe: Arab Publics Most Likely to Express 
Political Views Online (Pew Research 
Center Global Attitudes Project, 2012).
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Female and male respondents share content with similar frequency19 in six of the 17     
categories surveyed, including: personal issues, domestic politics, work/professional        
issues, community, foreign affairs, international politics, religion, and health, respectively. 
Females more often share content related to cultural issues, domestic news and events, 
societal/civic issues, gender, and the environment.
Males tend to share more content related to the economy, science/IT, and sports.
FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
Our findings also reveal some notable patterns in content-sharing behaviors between male 
and female respondents. 
According to our results:
19   Within a 3 percentage-point range.
Figure 15: Frequency of Topics Shared (by gender) 
68%
29%
50%
26%
48%
23%
48%
21%
42%
18%
18%
37%
15% 15%
29%
11% 11%
67%
12%
42%
27%
30%
12%
42%
18%
28%
23%
23%
40%
14% 14%
27%
27% 27%
Personal 
thoughts 
and opinions
Female
Male
Gender 
Cultural
Community 
issues
Domestic news 
and national 
current events
Environment
Societal/civic 
issues
Foreign 
affairs
Everyday life 
Economy
Sports
Domestic 
politics
International 
politics
Religion
School, work 
or professional 
issues
Science/IT Health
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 19
Younger respondents (ages 25 or younger) tend to share their personal thoughts and 
opinions more frequently than all other age groups.
Likewise, sharing behaviors differ according to the respondents’ age. 
Figure 16: Frequency of Sharing Personal Content (by age)
Figure 17: Frequency of Sharing Religious Content (by age)
Figure 18: Frequency of Domestic News Content (by age)
FACEBOOK USAGE AND ACTIVITIES
Younger respondents also share more news about about religion than other users.
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Respondents ages 30-39 tend to share more domestic news content than other 
age groups surveyed.
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Social networking sites constantly produce digital traces of a users’ activities. Moreover, 
many social media users provide personal information on their profile pages which make 
them easily identifiable.  One major concern for SNS users around the world is to what extent 
this may violate their privacy and what security risks this may entail—a concern heightened 
for SNS users living in media-restrictive environments in which access to these platforms is 
banned or limited.    
3.  TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
The issue of trust within social networks has become a key area of inquiry for scholars 
looking to measure the strength of online relationships and to understand the differences 
between online and offline social networks in general. Recent studies suggest that SNS   
users are more trusting of other people compared to non SNS-users.20 The issue of trust 
among Iranian users is more complicated due to Facebook being prohibited. Hence, in our 
survey we asked participants whether or not people, in general, can be trusted.21
3.1 Trust in Online Networks
Survey participants are not very trusting of 
people they do not know, yet most say they 
“friend” people they have never met or have 
only met once. Younger  respondents are the 
least trusting group compared to other groups 
in this survey.
KEY
FINDINGS:
20  Keith Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites 
and Our Lives (Pew Research Center’s Internet & 
American Life Project, 2011).
21  The question of trust in people is drawn from 
the Pew SNS and Facebook Survey 2010, See: 
Keith Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and 
Our Lives (Pew Research Center’s Internet & 
American Life Project, 2011).
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22  In comparison, 45% of American SNS users 
“agree that most people can be trusted,” Hampton 
et al., Social  Networking Sites and Our Lives, p. 33. 
23  In contrast, just 3% of the respondents in the US 
indicated trusting other people depends on other 
factors, Hampton et al., p. 33.
Respondents are not very trusting in general, with a majority reporting that “you can’t be 
too careful” or “it depends.”22
Younger respondents (ages 25 or younger) are the least-trusting group in comparison to 
other age groups surveyed.
According to our data:
Figure 19:  Trust in People 
TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
Most people  
can be trusted
You can’t be 
too careful
It depends Don’t 
know
56%
32%
2%11%
At the same time, a vast majority reported they have Facebook friends who they have never 
met or have only met once. Although this seems like contradictory data, it appears that      
respondents may consider other contextual cues to decide about the trustworthiness of 
other people, as nearly one third (31%) indicated that trusting other people depends on 
other  factors.23
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We also asked respondents about how satisfied they are with Facebook’s privacy options, 
as well as what specific privacy settings they use to protect their Facebook activities and 
profile from the general public and/or from members within their own friend network.
3.2 Facebook Privacy 
Just one third of respondents say they are satisfied 
with Facebook’s privacy options and policies.  A 
majority of survey participants report setting 
their profile visibility on “private” so that only 
their friends can see their profiles. More than half 
of respondents with “private”  settings also apply 
limits on what certain friends can see.
KEY
FINDINGS:
TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
Only a small percentage of respondents use completely public Facebook privacy settings. 
Six out of ten respondents set their accounts on private, allowing only those in their friend 
networks to access their profiles.
Roughly a quarter of respondents use “partially private” settings that allow a broader     
network of Facebook friends to access to their account profiles.
According to our data:
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In addition, our data shows that respondents are reluctant to publicly reveal information 
about a range of personal information, including: their relationships and family members, 
their friend networks, their religion, and their political affiliation.
Figure 21:  Access to Profile Information
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Figure 20: Facebook Profile Privacy Settings 
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Only  a small percentage of female respondents (15%) are concerned about whether their 
hijab is correct in the photos they publish on Facebook. 
A majority of female respondents are, however, concerned about posting photos in which 
they are engaged in activities considered culturally taboo or illegal (for instance, socializing 
with friends of opposite sex, drinking alchohol, dancing).
Male respondents are more conservative than females in this regard, with nearly eight 
out of ten males surveyed saying that they avoid posting photos in which they are depicted 
doing something considered culturally taboo or illegal.
We also asked participants about what they consider when posting pictures of themseleves 
on Facebook. 
Survey results show:
TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
Figure 22: Considerations When Posting Photos (by gender) 
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Given that Facebook is blocked in Iran and only accessible with the use of illegal circumven-
tion tools, our survey sought to understand the perception among respondents regarding 
the security risks associated with using Facebook.
3.3 Security Concerns
TRUST, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
A majority of respondents  believe using 
Facebook could risk their security to some 
extent and may pose risks to their job 
prospects and reputation.  Nearly half say they 
are “somewhat familiar” with stories about 
Facebook causing security threats to users. 
KEY
FINDINGS:
24  A Mann-Whitney test indicated that 
the risk of Facebook use for someone’s 
job prospect was perceived greater 
by the participants who has a higher 
education degree than among less 
educated participants (U = 4905, N=302, 
p = .001).
More than 65% of respondents surveyed believe it that using Facebook could pose some 
risks to their job prospects and reputation. 
Respondents also reported being familiar with security issues through the personal  
experiences of their friends and acquaintances and through international news sources, 
respectively.
Facebook users with higher education levels are more concerned about the potential 
impact Facebook could have on their job prospects.24 
According to our data:
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Figure 23: Perception of Risks of Facebook Usage on Job Prospects and Reputation
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In an effort to better understand the broader social networking environment in Iran, our 
survey asked respondents about other platforms they use in addition to Facebook.
4. ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITIES 
A majority of respondents are also active on at least 
two other Social Networking Sites. Google+ is by 
far the most popular social networking platform, 
followed by Twitter and LinkedIn. In addition, well 
over half of respondents say they have had their 
own blog.
KEY
FINDINGS:
Facebook was listed as the sole social networking platform by just 17% of respondents. 
Nearly two-thirds of respondents use Google+, while roughly 30% use Twitter and      
LinkedIn, respectively. 
About a fifth of respondents (17%) have a profile on Orkut, which was one of the first social 
networking sites in Iran, launched in 2004.25
Our survey results show:
25 In January 2005, the service was fil-
tered inside Iran, which sparked debates 
between members of the reformist gov-
ernment and the judiciary. See “Judiciary 
filtered PersianBlog and Orkut.” BBC 
Persian, January 9, 2005.  
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30   Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran: The Persian 
Blogs (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 
2005); Elizabeth M. Bucar and Roja 
Fazaeli, “Free Speech in Weblogistan? 
The Offline Consequences of Online 
Communication,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 40, no. 03 (2008): 
403–419; Philip Howard, The Digital Ori-
gins of Dictatorship and Democracy; John 
Kelly and Bruce Etling, “Mapping Iran’s 
Online Public: Politics and Culture in the 
Persian Blogosphere,” Berkman Center, 
2008; Antony Loewenstein, The Blogging 
Revolution (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne Uni-
versity Press, 2008); Annabelle Sreberny 
and Gholam Khiabany, Blogistan: The 
Internet and Politics in Iran (New York: I. 
B. Tauris, 2010).
31   In contrast, in the US as of 2010, 14% 
of internet users reported having ever 
managed their own online journal or 
blog. See Hampton et al., Social  Network-
ing Sites and Our Lives, 64.
32   This trend may also mirror other 
examinations of Iranian bloggers which 
demonstrate how many bloggers have 
migrated to Facebook and other SNSs to 
post and share content. See, Laurent Gi-
acobino et al, “Whither Blogestan: Eval-
uating Shifts in Persian Cyberspace,” 
Iran Media Program, Center for Global 
Communication Studies, Annenberg 
School for Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania, March 2014. 
ADDITIONAL SNS ACTIVITY 
About two thirds of survey respondents (61%) confirmed that they have managed their 
own online journal or blog.31
Generally, blogging is more popular among the younger respondents, with more than 
69% of users younger than age 30 reporting that they have managed their own blog.
Our survey results also confirm findings from other scholars about the popu-
larity of blogging among Iranians.30
These findings coincide with the Iran Media Program’s survey  conducted among young         
internet users in Iran which showed that 54% of respondents wrote their own blog.32
Figure 24: Additional SNS Usage Among Respondents
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The 2009 election in Iran and the Arab Spring that followed put a spotlight on the democratizing 
potential of social media and social networking sites, particularly in societies in which commu-
nication flows are restricted by state authorities. Scholars, policy makers and media outlets at 
the time made hopeful assertions about the potential for these technologies to mobilize civic ac-
tivism and drive social and political change in the Middle East. However, it is increasingly clear 
that a more nuanced understanding of how social media are used in specific cultural contexts is 
necessary to substantiate early claims about their powers of political efficacy. 
Our findings indicate that Iranians rely on Facebook primarily to communicate with friends 
and family and only a small percentage use Facebook for political purposes. As such, it ap-
pears that Facebook functions as an alternative or quasi “public space” where social norms 
and codes of conduct for public life are less restrictive. 
In addition, our research demonstrates that Iranian Facebook users are adept at circum-
venting technical restrictions that impede access to the social networking site. That most 
respondents in our survey report accessing Facebook with high-speed broadband from 
home indicates that the state’s restrictions on faster internet speeds for residential ser-
vices is no longer enforced by ISPs, perhaps in keeping with market demands. Likewise, 
our data confirms the widespread use of VPNs as the circumvention tool of choice among 
Iranian Facebook users, particularly among older, less tech-savvy respondents. Yet even 
with high-speed internet, the use of circumvention tools considerably reduces connection 
speeds; therefore, Iranian Facebook users have trouble consuming and sharing the rich 
multimedia content offered on Facebook. 
Our research indicates that while respondents frequently use Facebook, most appear to 
be passive rather than active users, with a majority preferring to follow rather than share 
content, especially politically oriented materials. In contrast, there is less disparity in fol-
lowing and sharing behaviors with regard to content about personal, cultural, and societal 
issues. This may indicate that Iranian Facebook users are less comfortable sharing political 
content given that certain kinds of political expression are heavily disincentivized. Notably, 
our research shows that Iranians are less interested in sharing content about religion than 
most SNS users in the Middle East, which highlights some national and socio-political dif-
ferences in SNS use across the region. 
Our data also demonstrate the complexity of security-related issues with regard to the use of 
Facebook and circumvention tools in Iran. While respondents express concerns about Face-
book’s security and privacy settings, they do not appear to be overly concerned about the 
security risks of using circumvention tools—which is reflective of how commonplace the use of 
these tools to access blocked social media sites have become. It is also indicative of how many 
Iranians are attracted to social networking sites like Facebook as platforms for self-expression 
and alternative sources of information despite the risks it might entail. 
CONCLUSION
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 30
Alavi, Nasrin. We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs. Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005.
Anderson, Collin. “Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censor-
ship in Iran.” arXiv (June 18, 2013). http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4361.
Bucar, Elizabeth M., and Roja Fazaeli. “Free Speech in Weblogistan? The Offline Conse-
quences of Online Communication.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 03 
(2008): 403–419. 
Corley, Anne-Marie. “The Web vs. the Republic of Iran: Twitter Gives Iranians a Voice, but 
the Government Still Controls the Internet.” MIT Technology Review, June 18, 2009. http://
www.technologyreview.com/news/413903/the-web-vs-the-republic-of-iran/.
“Editorial: Iran’s Twitter Revolution.” The Washington Times. Accessed February 20, 2014. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution/.
Erfanian, Morteza, Seyed Alireza Javadinia, Mohammadreza Abedini, and Bita Bijari. “Ira-
nian Students and Social Networking Sites: Prevalence and Pattern of Usage.” 2nd World 
Conference on Educational Technology Research 83, no. 0 (July 4, 2013): 44–46. 
“Facebook is an espionage site, played a role in the 2009 unrests.” BBC Persian, Decem-
ber 9, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2013/12/131209_me_facebook_espionage.
shtml.
Farahani, Hojjat.A, Somayeh Aghamohamadi, Zeynab Kazemi, Firoozeh Bakhtiarvand, and 
Mojtaba Ansari. “Examining the Relationship between Sensitivity to Rejection and Using 
Facebook in University Students.” World Conference on Educational Technology Researches 
- 2011 28, no. 0 (2011): 807–810. 
Forte, Maximilian. “America’s Iranian Twitter Revolution.” Zero Anthropology, June 17, 2009. 
http://zeroanthropology.net/2009/06/17/americas-iranian-twitter-revolution/.
Garrett, R. Kelly. “Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Move-
ments and New ICTs.” Information, Communication & Society 9, no. 2 (April 2006): 202–224. 
Gladwell, Malcolm. “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted.” The New 
Yorker, October 4, 2010. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_
gladwell.
Hampton, Keith, Lauren Sessions Goulet, Lee Rainie, and Kristen Purcell. Social Network-
REFERENCES
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 31
ing Sites and Our Lives. Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project, 2011. 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Technology-and-social-networks.aspx.
Hodge, Nathan. “Taking to the Streets - and Tweets - in Tehran.” WIRED, sec. Danger Room. 
Accessed February 20, 2014. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/taking-to-the-
streets-and-tweets-in-tehran/.
Howard, Philip N. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technolo-
gy and Political Islam. Oxford Studies in Digital Politics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2010.
“Iran’s Facebook Access Restored.” BBC Persian, May 26, 2009. http://www.bbc.co.uk/per-
sian/iran/2009/05/090526_an_facebook_iran.shtml.
“Judiciary filtered PersianBlog and Orkut.” BBC Persian, January 9, 2005. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/01/050109_a_iran_weblog.shtml.
Kelly, John, and Bruce Etling. Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Per-
sian Blogosphere. Berkman Center, 2008. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2008/
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public.
Khazraee, Emad, and Kristene Unsworth. “Social Media: The New Opiate of the Masses?” 
International Review of Information Ethics 18 (2012): 49–59.
Kohut, Andrew, Richard Wike, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Katie Simmons, Jacob Poushter, 
Cathy Barker, James Bell, Bruce Stokes, and Elizabeth Mueller Gross. Social Network-
ing Popular Across Globe: Arab Publics Most Likely to Express Political Views Online. 
Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project, December 2012. http://www.pewglobal.
org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/.
Laurent Giacobino et al., “Whither Blogestan: Evaluating Shifts in Persian Cyberspace,” Iran 
Media Program, Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Commu-
nication, University of Pennsylvania, 2014. http://www.iranmediaresearch.org/en/research/
download/1607.
Loewenstein, Antony. The Blogging Revolution. Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2008.
MacKenzie, Donald A, and Judy Wajcman, eds. The Social Shaping of Technology. 2nd ed. 
Buckingham [England] ; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999.
Meier, Patrick. “Do ‘liberation Technologies’ Change the Balance of Power between Repres-
sive States and Civil Society?” PhD, Tuft University, 2011.
REFERENCES
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 32
REFERENCES
Moradabadi, Younes Nouri, Maryam Asbaghi Gharehshiran, and Kourosh Amrai. “What Is 
the Motivation Student of Iranians for Using Facebook?” 4th World Conference on Educa-
tional Technology Research (WCES-2012) 02-05 February 2012 Barcelona, Spain 46, no. 0 
(2012): 5192–5195. 
Morozov, Evgeny. “Iran: Downside to the ‘Twitter Revolution.’” Dissent Magazine, Fall 2009. 
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/iran-downside-to-the-twitter-revolution.
“Negotiation about removing Facebook filtering in Iran, criticized by members of 
Parliament.” BBC Persian, November 23, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/
iran/2013/11/131123_l45_facebook_filtering_majlis.shtml.
Santana, Rebecca. “Tweeting Iran: Elex News in 140 Characters or Less.” Associated Press, 
June 15, 2009.
Shabani, Elahe, Mehri Shahzeidi, Younghoon Chang, and Myeong-Cheol Park. Motivations, 
Concerns, and Strategies of Facebook Users in Iran. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, September 5, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2331894.
Shafer, Jack. “Doubting Twitter.” Slate, June 17, 2009. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/press_box/2009/06/doubting_twitter.html.
Sreberny, Annabelle, and Gholam Khiabany. Blogistan : The Internet and Politics in Iran. 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010.
Sullivan, Andrew. “The Revolution Will Be Twittered.” The Atlantic, June 13, 2009, sec. 
The Daily Dish. http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-revolu-
tion-will-be-twittered/200478/.
Tufekci, Zeynep, and Christopher Wilson. “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in 
Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square.” Journal of Communication 62, no. 2 
(2012): 363–379.
Van de Donk, Wim, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon, and Dieter Rucht, eds. Cyberprotest: 
New Media, Citizens, and Social Movements. London ; New York: Routledge, 2004.
Wojcieszak, Magdalena, and Briar Smith. “Will Politics Be Tweeted? New Media Use by      
Iranian Youth in 2011.” New Media & Society (March 25, 2013). 
Wojcieszak, Magdalena, Briar Smith, and Mahmood Enayat. Finding a Way: How Iranians 
Reach for News and Information. The Iran Media Program’s 2011-2012 Report on Media 
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 33
Consumption in Iran. Philadelphia: Iran Media Program, 2012. http://iranmediaresearch.
org/en/research/pdffile/990.
Yahyanejad, Mehdi, and Collin Anderson. “Measuring the Usage of Circumvention Tools.” 
presented at the USENIX Security Symposium, San Franciso, CA, 2011.
REFERENCE
LIKING FACEBOOK IN TEHRAN: SOCIAL NETWORKING IN IRAN | 34
This study is designed based on a previous qualitative study of Facebook use among Irani-
ans. In the former study, we first conducted a series of qualitative interviews and a content 
analysis of activities of Iranian Facebook users to better understand the specific issues of 
SNS use among Iranians. Findings of the assessment were used to design the online survey 
of Iranian Facebook users for this current study. 
In effort to reach the target population, a link to a Persian-language survey on Facebook 
was distributed via Facebook’s advertisement system. However, this method proved chal-
lenging, as Facebook’s advertisement system targets users based on information such as 
their location and language, yet neither of these options are available in Facebook’s adver-
tisement system for the Iranian or Persian language. 
We therefore developed strategies to overcome the limitation of this feature in order to 
target Iranian users inside Iran. Since access to Facebook requires circumvention tools to 
bypass filtering using proxy servers outside Iran, we decided to use proxy servers’ locations 
for targeting users inside Iran. A former study shows that the majority of proxy servers exit 
through the United States, Germany, the UK, Netherlands, France, Canada or Sweden. We 
also used the “interests targeting” feature of Facebook advertising which targets users 
based on users’ profile content and onsite connections. Therefore, we added a group of 
keywords both in English and Persian such as Iran, Persian, Farsi, the name of major cities 
in Iran, and popular sports clubs as target interests. In order to avoid a biased sampling, 
we did not use controversial keywords or political terms. According to Facebook’s adver-
tisement system, the size of potential audience for our advertisement campaign reached to 
2,284,840 users. To maximize the outreach of the survey we also used snowball sampling to 
spread the link to the survey on Facebook.
ANNEX: DATA COLLECTION  
AND METHODOLOGY 
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